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Introduction 
On November 22, 2005, CNN reported that an unmarried preschool 
teacher at St. Rose of Lima Catholic School in Queens, New York, had 
become pregnant and was fired from her first teaching position.1  Michelle 
McCusker appeared on national news that night at a press conference, 
crying about losing her first job just a week after she told her employer that 
she was pregnant.  In its coverage, CNN showed McCusker’s letter of 
termination, which stated, "[a] teacher cannot violate the tenets of Catholic 
morality. . . .  [T]ermination of contract must occur."2  Some journalists 
called her behavior "shameless" and said that she should have 
"acknowledged the justice of the school’s position, and resigned."3  Others 
supported the school’s position, suggesting that it "fired her because a 
visibly pregnant and unmarried authority figure dealing with young 
children is conveying a message . . . that the church does not want to 
send."4  The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)5 took on 
McCusker’s case and asserted that under current law, no private school will 
ever have a legitimate legal reason to fire a pregnant woman who is 
unmarried because of her supposedly immoral actions outside the 
classroom.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Fired Teacher Sues (CNN Television Broadcast Nov. 22, 2005) (transcript on file 
with author). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Carol Platt Liebau, Sexual Morality Is Lost in New York, HUMAN EVENTS (July 28, 
2009), http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=10580 (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 4. John Leo, The Case of Michelle McCusker, TOWNHALL (July 28, 2009), 
http://townhall.com/columnists/JohnLeo/2005/12/05/the_case_of_michelle_mccusker (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 5. The NYCLU is the New York State affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU). 
 6. NYCLU Defends Pregnant School Teacher Fired by School, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nyclu-defends-pregnant-school-teacher-fired-
A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 531 
This Note will investigate and ultimately support the position of the 
NYCLU, citing to cases from multiple circuits while exploring the genesis 
and development of pregnancy discrimination claims over the past fifty 
years.  Part I will describe Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Title VII’s amendment to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978.  That Part will explain how plaintiff women work within the 
framework of Title VII to establish a claim, and how defendant schools can 
defeat an accusation of pregnancy discrimination.  Part II will discuss the 
religious entities exceptions to Title VII, highlighting the inconsistent 
application and problematic broadening of the ministerial exception and 
other exemptions.  In Part III, this Note will explain the troublesome 
application of the "bona fide occupational qualification" standard to 
teachers in religious schools, with schools claiming that a teacher either 
failed to abide by a moral code or failed to serve as an appropriate role 
model.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note will conclude by stating that none of 
these loopholes that schools use to escape liability under Title VII should be 
applied to cases involving pregnancy discrimination, because teachers—
who are largely not ministers—cannot be treated equally, without regard to 
sex, in enforcing a policy that disproportionately targets those with swelling 
abdomens. 
I.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act 
A.  The Route to Equality:  An Historical Background 
Before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some employers 
regularly discriminated against women.  Patriarchal norms permitted 
employers to pigeonhole women into stereotypically female professions or 
to prohibit them from performing stereotypically male jobs.7  The U.S. 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 to remedy and 
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.  Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
                                                                                                                 
school [hereinafter NYCLU Defends] (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 7. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon:  One Hundred Years Later, 
45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 359 (2009). 
 8.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (2010). 
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1. To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
2. To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.9 
Congress’ enacting Title VII was a great success for women, but the 
law did not combat the employment discrimination teachers often faced if 
they became pregnant.10  If a pregnant teacher was not terminated without 
hesitation or did not resign, then she could be pushed into a mandatory 
pregnancy leave that was much longer than necessary and did not hold her 
job.11  School boards unhesitatingly dismissed teachers who were pregnant, 
particularly if they were unmarried, and based their decisions on both 
student-centered and teacher-centered reasoning.12  They claimed that 
pregnant, unmarried teachers would have a poor moral influence on 
students, while at the same time they paternalistically sought to protect 
women from "giggling schoolchildren."13  Women were discriminated 
against because of their pregnancies and had no available legal remedy for 
their problem.14 
                                                                                                                 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a)(1)–(2). 
 10. See generally Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 350–59 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998) (providing an historical background of the changing roles of women in society, 
shifting sexual mores, and the role of religion in both). 
 11. Susan A. Kidwell, Note, Pregnancy Discrimination in Educational Institutions:  A 
Proposal to Amend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1288 
(2001). 
 12. Id. at 1290–91 ("With respect to the mandatory leave policies, the Court 
recognized the liberty interest of teachers who decide to bear children but also 
acknowledged legitimate state interests in maintaining continuity in the classroom and 
protecting the health of teachers and their unborn children."). 
 13. Id. at 1291 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 
(1974)). 
 14. See id. at 1303 (describing the lack of legal remedy for the pregnant teachers when 
the employers were able to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their 
discriminatory action because any reasonable proffered explanation was enough to warrant 
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim). 
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Twelve years after Title VII was enacted, General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert,15 brought pregnancy discrimination to the attention of the nation.  
In this case, the Supreme Court found that pregnancy discrimination did not 
constitute sex discrimination and hence was not prohibited by Title VII.16  
The Court rejected an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(E.E.O.C.) guideline that would have brought pregnancy discrimination 
under Title VII’s protective umbrella.17  Instead, it found that General 
Electric’s insurance policy did not inherently discriminate against women 
in failing to cover pregnancy-related claims because those claims were only 
a few of the many denied without regard to sex.18  Justice Brennan strongly 
dissented, stating that "the E.E.O.C.’s construction of sex discrimination 
under § 703(a)(1) is fully consonant with the ultimate objective of Title VII, 
‘to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered (sexually) [sic] 
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of (women) [sic].’"19  
Congress, agreeing with Justice Brennan’s view, "unambiguously 
expressed its disapproval"20 with Gilbert and amended Title VII through the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)21 two years later, in 1978.  The PDA 
describes discrimination based on pregnancy as included within the 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 16. See id. at 138 ("[I]t is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in 
this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive 
benefits . . . ."). 
 17. See id. at 140–41 (citing to the E.E.O.C. guideline).  That E.E.O.C. guideline is as 
follows: 
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, 
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary 
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary 
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with 
employment. . . . [Benefits] shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or 
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other 
temporary disabilities. 
29 CFR § 1604.10(b) (1975). 
 18. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138–39 ("[G]ender-based discrimination does not result 
simply because an employer’s disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive."). 
 19. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); see also Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with 
Possibility:  Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 819, 819–20 
(2001) (analyzing the intended meaning of Title VII with respect to sex discrimination). 
 20. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 678 
(1983). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
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statutory description of discrimination based on sex.22  In subsequent 
decisions, courts consistently ruled that the PDA made it illegal for 
pregnant women to be fired on the basis of their pregnancies alone.23  
Because of the PDA, pregnant women finally had a legal response to the 
discrimination their predecessors had experienced for decades. 
B.  Establishing a Claim:  McDonnell Douglas and Burden Shifting 
Even before a teacher alleging pregnancy discrimination has an 
opportunity to establish her prima facie case, the defendant school has a 
chance to file a motion that could remove the case from the purview of Title 
VII, and thus potentially from the reach of the court system.  The defendant 
could file for summary judgment, arguing that the "ministerial exception" to 
Title VII prevents the court from interfering with the school’s hiring and 
firing of ministers, and claiming that the plaintiff serves a ministerial 
function.24  Alternatively, the defendant school could argue in a summary 
judgment motion that the court’s Title VII analysis is prohibited because 
other religious exemptions to Title VII25 disqualify the courts from 
examining the reasons behind a religious organization’s employment 
decisions.  If the court decides that the plaintiff was not a "minister," or that 
an organization’s employment decision was based on a religious tenet but 
was not so religiously grounded that examination for pretext would involve 
                                                                                                                 
 22. The text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is as follows: 
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 
2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 23. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999) (denying a 
defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment on a pregnancy discrimination claim).  
In denying the motion, the court stated that "[Congress] designed the PDA specifically to 
address the stereotype that ‘women are less desirable employees because they are liable to 
become pregnant,’ . . . and to insure that the decision whether to work while pregnant ‘was 
reserved for each individual woman to make for herself.’" Id. (citations omitted). 
 24. See generally Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII:  The Case for a 
Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776 (2008) (examining the scope and 
applicability of the ministerial exception to Title VII cases). 
 25. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365–67 (9th Cir. 
1986) (describing the scope of Title VII’s religious exemptions). 
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excessive entanglement between government and the religious entity, then 
the plaintiff’s claim may proceed past summary judgment.26 
In order to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, however, the 
plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination.  
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,27 established a test for all Title 
VII discrimination cases that is used to determine whether the plaintiff 
has proven her prima facie case.28  As specifically applied to 
pregnancy discrimination, the four prongs of the McDonnell Douglas 
test are: 
1. The plaintiff must prove that she was pregnant; and 
2. She must prove that she was meeting the requirements of 
her job; and 
3. She must prove that she was terminated, or otherwise 
suffered an adverse employment action; and 
4. She must prove that the circumstances of her termination 
give rise to an inference of discrimination.29 
Often in pregnancy discrimination cases involving single teachers 
at sectarian schools, the defendant school will argue that the plaintiff 
was terminated for failure to fulfill the second prong of the analysis.  
Schools argue that a teacher’s conforming to a particular moral code of 
conduct or serving as a role model was a condition of the teacher’s 
employment, or "bona-fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ).30  
Ultimately, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving all four points, then the 
burden of proof shifts to the employer, who must proffer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for termination.31 
In a pregnancy discrimination case involving a sectarian school, 
the school will typically argue that it is exempt from the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a 
four-prong evidentiary framework for employment discrimination cases filed under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). 
 28. See id. (enumerating the prongs of the test) 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980) 
(describing the school’s argument that plaintiff, a teacher, failed to meet the BFOQ of 
adherence to a particular code of religious conduct and was terminated because of this 
failure). 
 31. See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–56 (1981) 
(articulating the nature of the burden of proof that shifts to the defendant). 
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nondiscrimination requirements of Title VII through one of a variety of 
religious exceptions.32  If the defendant is able to prove that the 
plaintiff teacher is a ministerial employee—i.e., an employee whose 
job involves "ministering" to her students—then the court will not 
examine the religious justification behind the plaintiff’s termination 
and will not allow the plaintiff to attempt to prove that such a 
justification was pretextual; thus, the litigation ceases.33  If the 
defendant instead claims another religious exemption from Title VII, 
the plaintiff "may not challenge the plausibility of putative religious 
purposes.  A fact finder will necessarily have to presume that an 
asserted religious motive is plausible in the sense that it is reasonably 
or validly held."34  Though the plaintiff may not challenge the 
legitimacy of the stated religious reason for the adverse employment 
action, in some circuits she may claim that the stated reason is 
pretextual, focusing on "factual questions such as whether the asserted 
reason for the challenged action comports with the defendant’s policies 
and rules, whether the rule applied to the plaintiff has been applied 
uniformly, and whether the putative non-discriminatory purpose was 
stated only after the allegation of discrimination."35 
If the plaintiff is able to prove that the defendant’s stated religious 
reason for termination is in fact pretextual, and that the defense’s given 
reason is only an excuse for termination when the actual reason is 
discriminatory, then the plaintiff will likely win her case.  In 
pregnancy discrimination cases, plaintiffs often accomplish this by 
proving that, while the defendant’s stated reason for termination was 
facially non-discriminatory, the proffered reason was not enforced 
equally across the sexes.36  Though this might seem a fairly simple way 
for a case to progress, the legal history of trials dealing with pregnant 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See, e.g., Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 
219 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The Court . . . noted that Congress had carved out exceptions to the 
Controlled Substances Act for peyote use, possession, and transportation by all members of 
recognized Indian tribes."). 
 33. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167 
(4th Cir. 1985) ("Ecclesiastical decisions are generally inviolate; civil courts are bound to 
accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical 
polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or 
law.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 34. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
("Religious codes of morality must be applied equally to male and female teachers."). 
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unwed women in religious schools has become far more complex than 
one might expect. 
II.  Religious Entities’ Exceptions to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Often a religious school facing a pregnancy discrimination suit will 
claim that its decision to terminate a pregnant employee was not pregnancy 
discrimination, but discrimination on the basis of religion.37  If the actions 
of the school indeed constituted permissible religious discrimination, and 
this defense is not pretextual, then the school may in fact be excused from 
abiding by Title VII through an exception.38 
A.  The Ministerial Exception 
The ministerial exception, which derives from the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment,39 prevents a court from 
scrutinizing a religious organization’s employment decisions regarding its 
ministers under Title VII.40  In plain terms, when a religious organization 
persuades a court that the person it terminated functioned as a minister, then 
the former employee cannot argue that the former employer discriminated 
against him or her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.41  The reasoning behind this exception is understandable:  because 
ministers act as the "lifeblood" of the religious institution and represent the 
religious institution to its people, the institution should not be limited in 
employment decisions concerning ministers.42  In addition, when a religious 
organization takes an adverse employment action against one of its 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?  The Constitutionality of the 
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007). 
 38. See id. at 1975 (explaining that "[t]his autonomy covers all aspects of the 
ministerial employment relationship, not just hiring and firing" (emphasis added)). 
 39. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."). 
 40. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–61 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(establishing the ministerial exception by holding that the application of Title VII to a 
religious organization’s employment decision regarding its ministers would violate the First 
Amendment). 
 41. See Corbin, supra note 37, at 1975–76 (observing that religious organizations 
maintain complete discretion regarding the employment of their ministers despite a number 
of anti-discrimination statutes). 
 42. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558–59. 
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ministers, it is not required to articulate a legitimate "religious" 
justification.43  The Fifth Circuit has consistently reasoned that "we cannot 
conceive how the federal judiciary could determine whether an employment 
decision concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate 
grounds without inserting ourselves into a realm where the Constitution 
forbids us to tread, the internal management of a church."44  Thus, courts 
give great deference to churches with respect to their employment decisions 
concerning ministers. Additionally, ministerial employees do not have to be 
employed by churches; rather, universities, religious schools, and hospitals 
might hire and fire such "ministers."45  Regardless of the employer, if a 
court decides that an employee is serving in a ministerial capacity, that 
decision is outcome determinative:  the employer will almost always 
prevail.46   
These policy justifications came to the forefront of analysis in 
McClure v. Salvation Army,47 the 1972 case in which the Fifth Circuit 
created the ministerial exception to Title VII, stating that "government lacks 
the constitutional power to regulate discriminatory employment practices 
by a religious entity against one of its ministers."48  In that case, the court 
held that a female minister was barred from bringing a Title VII claim 
against her church, because a central guarantee of the religion clauses is to 
give churches the "power to decide for themselves . . . matters of church 
governance as well as those of faith and doctrine."49  Title VII was 
inapplicable to the church/minister relationship, because its application to 
ministerial employment decisions "would result in an encroachment by the 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 
(4th Cir. 1985) (stating that "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects the act 
of a decision rather than a motivation behind it").   
 44. Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 
350 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibited 
the court from applying Title VII to a church’s decision to terminate a member of its clergy). 
 45. See Corbin, supra note 37, at 1976 (noting that courts have interpreted the term 
"minister" broadly). 
 46. See id. at 2038 ("As applied by the lower courts, the ministerial exemption 
currently grants religious organizations full immunity from [employment discrimination] 
claims brought by ministerial employees."). 
 47. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding 
that "Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions 
of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister"). 
 48. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class 
Discrimination by Religious Entities:  A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 
1216–17 (1994) (citing McClure, 460 F.2d at 560–61). 
 49. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (citations omitted). 
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State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the 
principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment."50  Thus, the 
freedom of religious employers to choose their ministers is virtually 
absolute—such employers are not even required to articulate the reasoning 
behind their decisions.51 
A religious employer’s use of the ministerial exception becomes 
particularly troublesome when the employee who has suffered adverse 
employment action is not a "minister" by title; instead, he or she might be a 
principal, a teacher, or even a press secretary.52  In Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,53 the Fourth Circuit defined the 
parameters of who may be considered a ministerial employee, stating that 
"if the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, 
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or 
participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered 
clergy."54  The Rayburn court also noted that the ministerial exception to 
Title VII "does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the 
position."55  Since the Rayburn decision, a court’s analysis of which 
employees constitute ministers has become, predictably, a rather complex 
matter. 
1.  The "Primary Duties Test" and Inconsistencies in Its Application 
Typically, courts decide whether an employee is a "minister" through 
application of the "primary duties" test, which has its foundation in 
Rayburn.56  This test leads to inconsistent results.57  For example, in 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Corbin, supra note 37, at 1975 (explaining that the First Amendment protects 
effectively all employment decisions that include religious judgments). 
 52. See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 703–04 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (deciding that a press secretary was a minister, and holding that the First 
Amendment precluded the court’s jurisdiction). 
 53. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 
1170–72 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff’s sex and race discrimination claims, levied 
against a church that denied the plaintiff a pastoral position, were barred by the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment). 
 54. Id. at 1169. 
 55. Id. at 1168. 
 56. See Note, supra note 24, at 1776 (remarking that courts will only ask "whether an 
employee’s job responsibilities render him ‘important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of 
the church’" (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169)). 
 57. See id. at 1787–89 (identifying the problems associated with the application of the 
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Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,58 the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an elementary school teacher 
was a minister, although twelve of his thirteen job duties were expressly 
secular.59  The court found Clapper’s primary role to be "teaching and 
spreading the Seventh-day Adventist faith and supervising and participating 
in religious ritual and worship,"60 even though those activities consumed 
only 10.6% of his time.61  According to the decision, "the quantity of time 
an employee spends on religious matters must be considered alongside ‘the 
degree of the church entity’s reliance upon such employee to indoctrinate 
persons in its theology.’"62  The church’s dependence on Clapper to 
indoctrinate his students in the Seventh-day Adventist faith ultimately 
tipped the scales in favor of the ministerial exception.63 
In contrast, in Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,64 the 
Eastern District of New York held that an elementary school teacher at a 
Seventh-day Adventist school did not meet the primary duties test and thus 
did not qualify as a minister.65  Redhead is particularly relevant here, 
because it involved a religious school’s termination of a pregnant teacher, 
ostensibly because of her pregnancy.66  In Redhead, the court found that the 
ministerial exception did not apply to the plaintiff’s Title VII pregnancy 
and sex discrimination claims, because her teaching duties were primarily 
secular.67  Though Redhead did teach a Bible class, much like Clapper, this 
duty consumed only one hour per day, and her only other religious duty as a 
teacher was to attend a yearly religious ceremony.68  Ultimately, the court 
                                                                                                                 
primary duties test). 
 58. Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 
WL 904528 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a former teacher’s Title VII 
claim was barred because of the ministerial exception). 
 59. Id. at *3. 
 60. Id. at *7. 
 61. Id. at *4. 
 62. See Note, supra note 24, at 1788 n.75 (quoting Clapper, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL 
904528, at *7). 
 63. See Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at *7. 
 64. See Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220–
24 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the ministerial exception did not apply, because the 
terminated teacher’s duties were primarily secular, and that there existed a genuine question 
of fact as to whether the motive for plaintiff’s dismissal was religious or secular). 
 65. See id. at 221 (describing the application of the primary duties test as fact-specific 
and distinguishing its result from previous cases). 
 66. Id. at 214–16. 
 67. Id. at 221. 
 68. Id. at 214. 
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determined that Redhead was not a minister, the excessive entanglement 
challenges present in Clapper did not apply, and Redhead was permitted to 
proceed with her Title VII claim.69 
In rendering decisions such as Clapper and Redhead, courts often 
apply the primary duties test with inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary 
results.70  The results can devastate the case of a woman who was 
terminated because of her pregnancy then deemed to be a "minister" 
because potential entanglement concerns prohibit a court from examining 
whether a religious employer engaged in activities prohibited by Title VII. 
2.  The Ministerial Exception:  Stretched to Its Breaking Point? 
Clapper and Redhead illustrate a developmental flaw in the ministerial 
exception:   courts have stretched it to its breaking point.  In Caroline Mala 
Corbin’s article Above the Law?  The Constitutionality of the Ministerial 
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law,71 the author explores the 
expansion of the ministerial exception from its early narrow reach to its 
current broad swath.  Corbin questions whether courts have been loyal to 
the original purpose of the ministerial exception, as stated in McClure v. 
Salvation Army, which sought to protect church autonomy in choosing its 
ministers because "[a]ny attempt by the civil courts to limit the church’s 
choice of its religious representatives would constitute an impermissible 
burden on the church’s First Amendment rights."72 
Some courts have moved far beyond protecting such choices as the 
Catholic Church’s hiring only male priests.  The ministerial exception has 
been used, for example, to eliminate a Jewish nursing home’s liability 
under a Fair Labor Standards Act claim for unpaid overtime due to a 
Kosher supervisor.73 Other courts have been more hesitant to expand the 
reach of the ministerial exception, thereby limiting a religious 
organization’s ability to use discriminatory employment practices.74  In its 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 221, 224. 
 70. See Note, supra note 24, at 1788 (noting that the unpredictability leaves both 
religious institutions and their employees unsure of how such lawsuits will be decided). 
 71. See generally, Corbin, supra note 37. 
 72. Id. at 1975 (citations omitted). 
 73. Id. at 1976 (citing Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299, 
301 (4th Cir. 2004)) (discussing a case in which a court held that the Mashgiach, or kosher 
supervisor, of a predominantly Jewish nursing home was a minister for the purposes of 
federal employment laws, and that the nursing home was a religious institution under the 
ministerial exception, thereby barring the discrimination claim). 
 74. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. 
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1982 decision, E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Association,75 the 
Ninth Circuit stated that "Congress’s purpose to end discrimination is 
equally if not more compelling than other interests that have been held to 
justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious conviction."76  
Reflecting on McClure, the Pacific Press court referred to E.E.O.C. v. 
Mississippi College,77 another Fifth Circuit case, and stated: 
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit refused to broaden the McClure 
exemption to include the faculty at Mississippi College, noting 
that:  "The College’s faculty and staff do not function as ministers. The 
faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its 
congregation. They neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful 
nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine. That faculty 
members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians 
does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment 
matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical 
concern."78 
Though this definition of "minister" has largely given way to the broad 
"primary duties" test, applying a narrower standard to determine whether a 
teacher actually functions as a minister would lead to results becoming 
more consistent, both with one another and with the ministerial exception’s 
original purpose. 
B.  Statutory Religious Exemptions to Title VII 
1.  Amos and Analysis Under the First Amendment 
Even if an employee fails the primary duties test, a school may still 
attempt to classify its employment decision as outside the reach of Title 
                                                                                                                 
Cal. 1984) ("The School is entitled to hire only members of its faith for teaching positions 
and the like, but may not, under the § 702 exemption, discriminate against its employees 
thereafter."). 
 75. See E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(finding that a secretary was not a minister under McClure, and thus that her employer could 
not avail itself of the ministerial exception). 
 76. Id. at 1280. 
 77. See E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485–86 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
the ministerial exception should be applied narrowly, and that it did not apply to the 
relationship between a religious educational institution and its faculty), cert. denied, 453 
U.S. 912 (1981). 
 78. See Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d at 1278 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 
626 F.2d at 485). 
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VII.79  Often this is done by articulating a religious reason for termination 
and attempting to fit into one of the narrow written exemptions to Title 
VII.80  These exemptions excuse religious employers from Title VII by 
permitting them to employ only members of their own faith in their non-
profit activities. 81  In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,82 the Supreme Court upheld these 
exemptions, stating that such a rule was constitutionally permissible and 
"rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant 
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to 
define and carry out their religious missions."83  Yet, as the Ninth Circuit 
stated in E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, "although 
Congress permitted religious organizations to discriminate in favor of 
members of their faith, religious employers are not immune from liability 
for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or for retaliatory 
actions against employees who exercise their rights under the statute."84  In 
that case, for example, the court decided that although the wage disparity 
between men and women at a religious publishing company was a sincere 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Tree of Life Christian Schs. 751 F. Supp. 700, 709 (S.D. 
Ohio 1990) ("Tree of Life argues that to apply the Act and invalidate its head of household 
allowance would violate its rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment."). 
 80. See, e.g.,  E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365–1367 (9th Cir. 
1986) (stating that Title VII exempts religious employers "only with respect to 
discrimination based on religion, and then only with respect to persons hired to carry out the 
employer’s ‘religious activities’"). The court held that a religious school’s stated reason for 
the disparity in men’s and women’s wages—the religious belief that men, as heads of 
households, should be paid more—was insufficient to exempt the school from liability for 
sex discrimination.  Id. at 1367. 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) states that "[t]his subchapter shall not apply to an 
employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment 
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by 
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities" (emphasis 
added).  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) states that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for a school . . . to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such 
school . . . is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a 
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the 
curriculum of such school . . . is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion" 
(emphasis added). 
 82. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (holding that applying Title VII’s religious exemption 
to a religious organization’s secular nonprofit activities was permissible under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). 
 83. Id. at 339. 
 84. E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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reflection of religious beliefs, such a disparity still constituted 
impermissible gender discrimination under Title VII.85 
Courts find it difficult to make decisions similar to the holding in 
E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press.  In cases involving religious discrimination as 
well as potential gender discrimination, they must interpret Title VII in a 
way that gives credence to Title VII’s desire to remedy our nation’s "long 
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination."86  At the same time, they 
must neither endorse87 nor restrict88 the practice of religion, as the 
Establishment and the Free Exercise clauses, respectively, require.  The 
Supreme Court’s Lemon test89 sets forth three factors for courts to examine 
in determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment:  "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’"90 Similarly, the Court 
has examined three factors in determining whether a statute violates the 
Free Exercise Clause:  "(1) the magnitude of the statute’s impact upon the 
exercise of the religious belief; (2) the existence of a compelling state 
interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exercise of the religious 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See id. at 1277 ("We reject the argument that the exemption provided by section 
702 applies to all actions taken by an employer with respect to an employee whose work is 
connected with the organization’s ‘religious activities.’"). 
 86. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (holding that classifications 
based on sex are inherently suspect and deciding that the federal statute providing automatic 
dependency status for wives of male uniformed service employees but requiring husbands of 
female uniformed service employees to jump through administrative hoops to prove 
dependency violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 87. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.  "U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See also Bd. 
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (holding that 
a statute creating a special school district to encompass a religious village violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). 
 88. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires that "Congress shall 
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].  "U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See also 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that although Congress does 
have the power to enact legislation enforcing the right to free exercise, that power may be 
used only in preventative or remedial ways and cannot be used to substantively change the 
right itself). 
 89. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) (holding that the Rhode Island 
statute providing state aid to private schools was unconstitutional under the Establishment 
and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment, and setting out what became known as 
the Lemon test). 
 90. Id. at 612–13. 
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belief; and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the 
statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state."91  
Title VII is regularly scrutinized under these tests, and with varying results, 
when a former employee files a pregnancy discrimination claim against a 
religious employer. 
2.  Dolter, Vigars, and Application of the Statutory Exemptions 
In Dolter v. Wahlert High School,92 the Northern District of Iowa was 
faced with deciding whether examining an underlying claim of gender 
discrimination, regardless of the presence of a stated religious reason for 
termination, would violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment.93  
Dolter had been an English teacher at Wahlert, a private Roman Catholic 
high school.94  She was unmarried at the time of her employment and 
became pregnant; subsequently, her contract was not renewed.95  The high 
school cited her status as a pregnant unmarried woman as the reason her 
contract was not renewed, and Dolter sued on the grounds of gender 
discrimination.96 
Wahlert High School claimed that because the school was a religious 
one, the application of Title VII would result in excessive entanglement of 
church and state as prohibited under the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment.97  The court resolved the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, rejecting Wahlert’s claim.98  It used the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). 
 92. See Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270–271 (N.D. Iowa 1980) 
(holding that the application of Title VII to a former sectarian school teacher’s claim of sex 
discrimination would not violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment). 
 93. See id. (holding that the application of Title VII to a former sectarian school 
teacher’s claim of sex discrimination would not violate the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment). 
 94. Id. at 267. 
 95. See id. ("In June, 1978, defendant refused to honor that contract and terminated her 
employment allegedly on the grounds she was unmarried and pregnant."). 
 96. See id. (describing genesis of the suit). 
 97. Id. at 269–70 ("Defendant’s . . . assertion of Title VII jurisdiction over this case 
would entail excessive entanglement of government with the religious mission of the school 
is grounded on its essential argument that Ms. Dolter, as a Catholic lay teacher of English, is 
significantly involved in the religious pedagogical ministry of the Catholic Church."). 
 98. Id. at 270–71 ("The court concludes, therefore, that its assertion of Title VII 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim of Sex discrimination would not entail excessive 
entanglement in the religious mission of defendant’s school and would not be violative of 
the religion clauses of the first amendment."). 
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two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,99 to eliminate both Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise Clause concerns.100  First, the court asked whether 
Congress had "clearly expressed" its intention to have Title VII apply to 
religious schools; and second, it asked whether Title VII’s "anti-
discrimination strictures," when applied to religious schools, would result in 
excessive entanglement between church and state, thereby violating the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment.101  The court found that Congress 
had intended all employers, including private religious ones, to be bound by 
the standards set by Title VII unless an articulated exemption applied,102 
and reasoned that its examination of Dolter’s case would not require it to 
"pass judgment on the legitimacy of its religious teachings, its moral 
precepts and the administration of its religious pedagogical ministry."103  
Importantly, the Dolter court stated: 
The only issues the court need decide are whether those moral precepts, 
to the extent they constitute essential conditions for continued 
employment, are applied equally to defendant’s male and female 
teachers; and whether Ms. Dolter was in fact discharged Only [sic] 
because she was pregnant rather than because she obviously had pre-
marital sexual intercourse in violation of the defendant’s moral code.104 
It noted that to construe Title VII "to exempt all forms of 
discrimination in sectarian schools would itself raise First Amendment 
problems since it would imply the government’s special preference of 
sectarian schools over nonsectarian schools."105  Though this Establishment 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding that 
the National Labor Relations Act did not authorize the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction over 
teachers at sectarian schools—such an act would violate the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment). 
 100. See id. ("The First Amendment, of course, is a limitation on the power of 
Congress.  Thus, if we were to conclude that the Act granted the challenged jurisdiction over 
these teachers we would be required to decide whether that was constitutionally permissible 
under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment."). 
 101. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see also Dolter v. 
Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 268 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (applying the standard set forth 
in NLRB, 440 U.S. at 499). 
 102. See Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 266, 269 (noting that although Congress clearly 
intended to allow religious employers to hire only members of their own religion, "[t]here is 
no indication in the legislative history that when Congress enacted the 1972 amendment it 
also intended to exempt sectarian schools from liability for [s]ex discrimination."). 
 103. Id. at 270. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 269 (citing King’s Garden v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54–57 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
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Clause argument generally has not been used to support Title VII’s 
application to religious schools’ stating a religious reason for an adverse 
employment action, the decision signals a readiness by courts to limit the 
religious exemptions to Title VII when otherwise straightforward cases of 
actionable discrimination are present.106 
Whether a court could examine the religious justification for blatant 
sex discrimination was again at issue in Vigars v. Valley Christian Center 
of Dublin, California.107  Valley Christian Center terminated Vigars when 
she became pregnant while in the process of annulling one marriage and 
entering into another.108  In a motion to dismiss, the school claimed that 
Vigars had been terminated because her pregnancy outside of marriage was 
inconsistent with the beliefs of the church.109  Because the focus of the 
adverse employment action was her pregnancy and not her sexual behavior, 
the court determined that the school had engaged in per se pregnancy 
discrimination that could not be made permissible through use of a religious 
exemption.110  The court denied the motion to dismiss, and Valley 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, changing its defense.111  
Valley modified its claim based on the decision in Dolter v. Wahlert, 
proffering that it was Vigars’ adulterous relationship with the man who was 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class 
Discrimination by Religious Entities:  A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 
1221 (1994) (suggesting that the Dolter decision indicates that "governmental 
accommodation of nonreligious discrimination by a religious entity would constitute a 
prohibited establishment of religion"). 
 107. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992) (denying summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could prove that she 
had been fired because of her pregnancy).  The court stated that "[t]he PDA makes it clear 
that this is per se sex discrimination.  In enacting the PDA, Congress expressed its intention 
to apply Title VII to just such a case as this."  Id. 
 108. See id. at 804 ("[S]he was fired, [defendants] now allege, because the school 
learned that she was involved in an adulterous relationship (i.e., sexual relations with her 
‘new’ husband before she was divorced from her ‘old’ husband)."). 
 109. See id. (referring to her termination letter, which "states without equivocation that 
the reason for her termination was the fact that she was ‘pregnant without benefit of 
marriage,’ which condition was inconsistent with the religious values of the church and 
school"). 
 110. See id. at 807–08 ("[O]nly women can ever be fired for being pregnant without 
benefit of marriage.  Thus, women would be subject to termination for something that men 
would not be, and that is sex discrimination, regardless of the justification put forth for the 
disparity." (emphasis in original)). 
 111. Id. at 804 (describing the defendant’s change in tactics). 
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the father of her child, not her pregnancy outside of marriage, which served 
as the grounds for her termination.112 
In resolving the motion for summary judgment, the court stated, 
"defendants’ ‘new’ position—that plaintiff was fired for adultery, and not 
on account of her pregnancy—would not give rise to a Title VII claim."113  
However, the court would not turn a blind eye to the defendant’s previously 
stated reason for termination, and looked to precedent to determine whether 
a proffered religious reason for termination could be examined for 
pretext.114  It stated that "[t]he Supreme Court’s decision [in 
Amos] . . . simply does not state that all employment decisions of a 
religious entity are off limits from Title VII, so that churches are free to 
discriminate on the basis of sex or race while other non-religious employers 
are not."115  The court recognized the potential for sex discrimination in 
cases such as this one, because it is only women who bear the physical 
manifestation of sexual activity, and stated that if Title VII were not 
applied: 
[W]omen would be subject to termination for something that men would 
not be, and that is sex discrimination, regardless of the justification put 
forth for the disparity.  The fact that defendants’ dislike of pregnancy 
outside of marriage stems from a religious belief may be relevant to the 
Court’s First Amendment analysis, but it does not automatically exempt 
the termination decision from Title VII scrutiny.116 
Ultimately, in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
the court decided that Congress had intended Title VII to apply to 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. ("However, in their summary judgment motion, defendants—for the first 
time—assert that plaintiff’s termination had nothing to do with her pregnancy.  On the 
contrary, she was fired, they now allege, because the school learned that she was involved in 
an adulterous relationship. (i.e., sexual relations with her ‘new’ husband before she was 
divorced from her ‘old’ husband)."). 
 113. Id. at 805. 
 114. See id. ("[D]efendants’ ‘old’ position—that plaintiff was fired because she was 
pregnant . . . raises the possibility of sex discrimination.  If Title VII does not apply to that 
decision, there would . . . be no material fact in dispute . . . [P]laintiff would not be entitled 
to relief under Title VII in either event.").  The court goes on to state, "If Title VII does 
apply, however, the dispute as to the true basis for plaintiff’s termination becomes material."  
Id.  Therefore, the court looked to precedent to determine whether Title VII applies to the 
school’s decision to terminate the plaintiff based on her pregnancy and whether application 
of Title VII overcomes First Amendment scrutiny.  Id. at 805–10. 
 115. Id. at 807 (emphasis in original). 
 116. Id. at 808 (emphasis in original). 
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employment decisions based on sex, even when made by religious 
employers.117 
3.  A Split Among the Circuits 
This narrow reading of the religious exemptions to Title VII is not 
common to all the circuits.118  The Vigars court was persuaded primarily by 
Ninth Circuit cases, but based its narrow reading of the religious 
exemptions to Title VII on cases from the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits.119  In contrast to those circuits, the Third Circuit in Little v. 
Wuerl,120 decided that Title VII could not regulate a Catholic school’s 
decision not to renew a teacher’s contract because of her remarriage.121  The 
court decided that examining the school’s employment decisions through 
the lens of Title VII would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment 
clauses of the First Amendment,122 and concluded that Congress had not 
intended Title VII’s scope to be so broad.123  The Third Circuit recently 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See id. at 809 (stating that Title VII does not violate the Establishment Clause 
because its primary purpose is secular, and its primary effect is not to promote or inhibit 
religion, but to render illegal the vast majority of sex, race, and national origin-based 
discrimination).  The court also found that Title VII did not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because it is a "secular, neutral statute which, in this case, incidentally has a profound impact 
on defendants’ free exercise of their religion. "  Id. 
 118. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding a school’s decision 
not to renew a teacher’s employment contract was exempt from Title VII); see also Curay-
Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F.3d 130, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
former teacher’s Title VII claim was barred because such a claim would require the court to 
examine church doctrine, which would violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment). 
 119. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807–08 
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing to Ninth Circuit cases as well as the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in 
Rayburn and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Mississippi College). 
 120. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a school’s 
decision not to renew a teacher’s employment contract was exempt from Title VII). 
 121. See id. ("We recognize that Congress intended Title VII to free individual workers 
from religious prejudice.  But we are also persuaded that Congress intended the explicit 
exemptions to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and maintain communities 
composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal practices . . . .").  The court broadly 
interpreted the religious exemptions to Title VII, stating that Wuerl’s discriminatory action 
against Little would fit within the exemptions, even though Little was hired as a Protestant.  
Id. 
 122. See id. at 947 ("Application of this prohibition to the Parish’s decision would be 
constitutionally suspect because it would arguably violate both the free exercise clause and 
the establishment clause of the first amendment." (emphasis in original)). 
 123. See id. at 951 ("We conclude that the application of Title VII’s prohibition against 
religious discrimination to the Parish’s decision not to rehire Little would raise substantial 
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considered and followed this holding in Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline 
Academy of Wilmington,124 a case involving gender discrimination in a 
sectarian school, and cited to Little v. Wuerl for the proposition that a 
religious entity’s religious justification for discrimination could not be 
examined for pretext.125  The Curay-Cramer court stated: 
[I]nquiry into the employer’s religious mission is not only likely, but 
inevitable, because the specific claim is that the employee’s beliefs or 
practices make her unfit to advance that mission.  It is difficult to 
imagine an area of the employment relationship less fit for scrutiny by 
the secular courts.  Even if the employer ultimately prevails, the process 
of review itself might be excessive entanglement.126 
Thus, the circuits split regarding whether the religious exemptions to 
Title VII should be construed broadly or narrowly.127  The Supreme Court 
has failed to address the issue of whether a religious entity’s stated religious 
justification for discrimination can be examined for pretext.128 
III.  Arguments in the Alternative:  Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications 
Typically, if a religious employer fails to establish that the pregnant 
teacher whom it terminated was a minister, and fails to establish that 
application of Title VII to its religiously-based employment decision would 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional questions.  We further determine that neither Title VII’s plain language, nor its 
legislative history, demonstrates Congress’ affirmative intent that Title VII apply here."). 
 124. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F.3d 130, 142 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that a former teacher’s Title VII claim was barred because such a claim 
would require the court to examine church doctrine, which would violate the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment). 
 125. See id. at 138–39 ("[W]e concluded that applying Title VII to a claim of religious 
discrimination by an employee terminated from a Catholic school for marrying in violation 
of canon law would raise serious constitutional questions." (citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 
944, 950 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 126. Id. at 139 (quoting Wuerl, 929 F.2d at 949). 
 127. See E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 848 F. Supp. 899, 899–900 (D. 
Haw. 1993) (vacating an order granting summary judgment to the defendant and granting 
partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liability because according to the Ninth 
Circuit panel, defendant’s ‘Protestant’ hiring requirement is not protected by any Title VII 
exemption).  The court points out that the Ninth Circuit has chosen to construe the Title VII 
exemption narrowly, while all other circuits that have considered the issue have construed it 
broadly.  Id. 
 128. See id. at 900 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has declined to 
consider the conflict between circuits regarding whether the Title VII exemption should be 
construed narrowly or broadly). 
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raise any serious First Amendment issues, then it moves on to the 
nonreligious justifications.129  Specifically, schools state that the terminated 
teacher failed to satisfy a BFOQ for her position.130  This BFOQ defense 
was established in the Civil Rights Act of 1964;131 the standard for 
establishing that a particular characteristic is a BFOQ was articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson.132  In that case, the Court decided 
that employers could purposefully discriminate in their hiring practices if 
the essential duties of the job warranted it, but also cautioned that any 
employer who asserted this BFOQ defense would bear a heavy burden.133 
In the case of pregnancy discrimination against a sectarian school 
teacher, the school will usually assert that the teacher failed to satisfy a 
BFOQ either because she failed to abide by a particular moral code134 or 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 ("An 
employer may justify discrimination otherwise prohibited by Title VII by showing either a 
business necessity or a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)."). 
 130. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (establishing the 
bona fide occupational qualification as a defense).  The text of the defense, found in 
§ 2000e-2(e)(1), provides: 
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and 
employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for 
employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership 
or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship 
or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any 
such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (extending voting 
rights and outlawing racial segregation in schools, at the workplace, and by facilities that 
serve the general public). 
 132. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335–37 (1977) (holding that a 
correctional facility’s height and weight requirements for job applicants discriminated 
against women, stating that the requirements were not job related, but deciding that the 
height and weight requirements did serve as a bona fide occupational qualification because 
of particular circumstances). 
 133. See id. at 333–34 (referencing cases in which the BFOQ defense was narrowly 
interpreted and establishing that the BFOQ exception was meant to be an extremely narrow 
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex); see also Vigars, 
805 F. Supp. at 808 (stating that an employer seeking to establish a BFOQ defense bears a 
heavy burden). 
 134. See cases cited infra note 139 (citing cases in which the employer accused an 
employee of failing to abide by the moral code required by the school because she engaged 
in premarital sex and became pregnant, and therefore failed to satisfy a BFOQ). 
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because she failed in her capacity as a role model.135  Though the two are 
often conflated, they are actually distinct, and their usage as defense 
mechanisms has quite different implications.  Claiming that a woman failed 
to satisfy a BFOQ because she didn’t abide by a written moral code is 
relatively straightforward:  because she failed to follow the rules laid out in 
her employment contract, employee handbook, or manual, she disqualified 
herself with her behavior.136  This is, in its simplest form, a breach of 
contract claim, and if it is enforced equally across the sexes, then it does not 
appear unfair.137  Claiming that a woman failed to satisfy a BFOQ because 
she did not serve as a role model is a much more complex argument.  There 
are no set rules for a role model to follow, and what constitutes a role model 
in the context of an employee at a religious school varies greatly among 
schools.138 
A.  Employment Contracts and Written Expectations of Morality 
Religious schools often ask their employees to abide by a particular 
moral code, with some requiring that employees sign documents such as a 
"Teacher-Minister Contract" or a "Religious Statement."139  Courts are 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 703–05 (1987) 
(holding that the "role model rule" put in place by the staff to discourage unmarried 
pregnancies was a BFOQ); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 
808–09 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment because 
the primary function of the employee was to be a librarian and not a role model, and 
therefore the school’s defense that she did not satisfy a BFOQ failed). 
 136. See, e.g., Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 411 (6th Cir. 
1996) (noting that the faculty handbook plaintiff was given after being hired required 
teachers provide "a Christian example for the students" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 137. See id. at 414 (holding that plaintiff’s Title VII claim failed in part because 
defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that it had terminated both males and females 
that had engaged in extramarital sexual relationships in violation of the school’s moral 
code). 
 138. See Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1377, 1384 (1996) ("When individuals invoke the concept of role model, they refer to a 
diverse set of political virtues (positive role models) and vices (negative role models)."). 
 139. See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that a pregnant teacher who engaged in premarital sex signed a "Teacher-Minister 
Contract" and acknowledged that her position required her to "build and live Christian 
community, integrate learning and faith, and instill a sense of mission in her students" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that an unmarried, pregnant teacher signed a "Religious Statement" 
on her application for employment, agreeing that her "temperament and lifestyle" were "in 
accordance with the will of God and The Holy Scripture," and that she was expected to be a 
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usually willing to enforce these contracts, if the school can prove that it 
enforced the contract’s requirements equally across the sexes.140  The fact 
that a religious school requires its employees to sign a contract obligating 
them to abide by certain religious rules does not exempt the school from the 
mandates of Title VII.141  As a result, the school must show that it 
terminates male employees along with female employees in enforcement of 
its moral policies.142  This is particularly difficult, considering that the 
majority of sins do not present themselves with hairy palms, growing noses, 
crossed eyes, or anything else that would make one’s sins obvious—except 
for the one instance in which there is glaring evidence of moral 
transgression:  pregnancy outside of marriage.143 
Whether abiding by a "moral code" could be a BFOQ was an 
additional consideration in Dolter v. Wahlert High School.144  Wahlert, a 
Catholic school, claimed that if the court were to deny its religious 
exemption and to decide that the case should be judged under Title VII, a 
BFOQ defense would still be available because the school had a right to set 
standards of morality to which employees must conform.145  It claimed that 
teachers such as Ms. Dolter were required to abide by the moral and 
religious standards set by the Roman Catholic Church, one of which was 
                                                                                                                 
role model). 
 140. See Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414 (deciding that, in a teacher’s sex discrimination case in 
which she claimed her termination was based on her pregnancy, the school could not be held 
liable because it applied its policy against extramarital sex equally against men and women). 
 141. See Ganzy, 995 F.Supp. at 348 (stating that although inquiry by the courts into the 
religious faith required by a religious organization of its employees is constitutionally 
barred, application of Title VII in cases of gender discrimination does not violate the First 
Amendment, and therefore religious codes must apply to both male and female employees). 
 142. See id.  ("Religious codes of morality must be applied equally to male and female 
teachers."). 
 143. See id. at 344 ("Women can become pregnant.  Men cannot.  It is therefore 
sometimes easier to enforce restrictions on sexual activity against a woman employee.").  
The opinion goes on to state that "[n]evertheless, if a woman is dismissed from a teaching 
position in a religious school because she is pregnant, rather than because she had sexual 
relations, state and federal prohibitions on gender discrimination are violated."  Id. 
 144. See Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980) 
(denying defendant school’s motion for summary judgment in part because an issue of 
material fact existed as to whether the teacher’s pregnancy entitled the school to dismiss her 
under the BFOQ exception to Title VII). 
 145. See id. ("[D]efendant contends that it was entitled to impose upon its teachers a 
code of religious moral conduct and to expect them to follow, in their personal life and 
behavior, the recognized moral precepts of the Catholic Church. . . . [S]uch code and 
precepts constitute a bona fide occupational qualification . . . ."). 
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abstaining from sex outside of marriage.146  Under this defense, the school 
believed that its discrimination was justified because Ms. Dolter violated 
the school’s moral code with her actions and her resulting pregnancy.147 
The Northern District of Iowa resolved the motion for summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.148  It stated that restrictions specifically 
targeted at pregnancy are per se gender discrimination, because biology 
limits pregnancy to women,149 but said "[t]he court has no substantive 
quarrel with the possible merits of defendant’s contention that it may be 
entitled to impose a code of moral conduct as a bfoq."150  However, the 
court went on to state: 
[D]efendant’s asserted bfoq appears [to] relate to more religious and/or 
moral qualifications than to sexual qualifications.  To that extent, even 
where such code of conduct truly constitutes a legitimate religious bfoq, 
the law nonetheless requires that it not be applied discriminatorily on the 
basis of sex; that is, unequally to defendant’s male and female lay 
teacher employees.151 
In this case, the judge could find no instances in which men who had 
engaged in premarital sex had adverse employment actions taken against 
them, and so found that Ms. Dolter’s termination could have been the result 
of gender discrimination.152  The court noted that the actions of the school 
raised suspicion about whether the BFOQ defense was indeed pretextual, an 
issue brought up in many following cases.153  
Sixteen years after Dolter, a sectarian school successfully established 
that adherence to a moral code could be a BFOQ—and that such a BFOQ 
could be enforced equally across the genders—in Boyd v. Harding 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See id. at 270 ("[D]efendant asserts its right to impose upon all its teacher 
employees a code of moral conduct including the proscription of pre-marital sexual 
intercourse."). 
 147. See id. at 271 ("Defendant concludes that it was plaintiff’s alleged failure to meet 
such bfoq relating to morality that was the true reason for her discharge and not her sex."). 
 148. See id. (denying summary judgment to defendant school). 
 149. See id. at 270 n.4 ("The court certainly can take judicial notice of the fact that 
under present physiological laws of nature women are the only members of the human 
population who can become pregnant."). 
 150. Id. at 271. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See id. (referring to plaintiff’s affidavit, which asserted that she had knowledge 
that other single teachers, known to have violated defendant’s asserted code of conduct by 
engaging in premarital sex, were not discharged as she was). 
 153. See id. ("This . . . goes to the issue whether defendant’s asserted bfoq defense is 
pretextual . . . ."). 
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Academy.154  Andrea Boyd was a teacher at the preschool of Harding 
Academy, which was affiliated with the Church of Christ.155  The faculty 
handbook given to all teachers specified that in addition to professional 
ability, Christian character was the basis for hiring teachers at Harding, and 
that every teacher was required in all actions to be a Christian example for 
the students.156  In 1992, Boyd had a miscarriage while unmarried; she told 
her director about it, but was not terminated.157  Only in 1993, when Boyd 
again became pregnant while still unmarried, was she fired.158  Boyd’s 
supervisor initially told her that she was terminated because she was 
"pregnant and unwed," but later stated that she actually meant that Boyd 
was terminated because she had broken the school’s moral code by 
engaging in extramarital sex.159 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
summary judgment award in favor of the defendant, agreeing that Boyd 
could not establish a prima facie case because she did not adhere to the 
moral codes of the school, which Harding had established as a BFOQ of her 
job.160  An essential fact that sets the Boyd case apart from Dolter is that in 
Boyd, the school was able to successfully prove a qualification set forth in 
Dolter: that a school’s "code of conduct be applied equally to both 
sexes."161  It accomplished this by showing that Boyd’s termination was not 
the first occurrence of teacher termination at Harding because of 
extramarital sex, and that men as well as women had come under scrutiny 
and been fired because of their private sexual conduct.162  To disprove the 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(affirming the judgment of the district court that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof 
in establishing a Title VII gender discrimination claim when defendant articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination by claiming that she was 
fired for extramarital sex rather than for being pregnant). 
 155. Id. at 411. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 412. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 412 n.2 ("Rubio testified that she was trying to be ‘as gentle as [she] could’ 
with Boyd and that by saying that plaintiff was pregnant and unwed, she actually meant that 
plaintiff had engaged in sex outside of marriage."). 
 160. See id. at 414–15 ("[T]he district court was correct in holding that defendant 
articulated a . . . non-discriminatory reason by stating that it fired plaintiff . . . for engaging 
in sex outside of marriage . . . Boyd did not meet her burden to prove . . . that this articulated 
reason was actually a pretext for illegal discrimination."). 
 161. Id. at 414 (citing Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 
1980)). 
 162. Id. 
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contention that Boyd was fired because of her pregnancy, which would be a 
violation of the PDA, the principal cited several examples of married 
women who became pregnant while teaching and showed the school’s 
compliance with the law in these cases. 
Whether such a BFOQ can ever realistically be enforced equally 
across the genders is a matter still up for debate, however.163  In Boyd, the 
President of Harding Academy came to know of other behaviors in 
opposition to the school’s moral code, and thus was able to punish those 
who did not abide by it, because of gossip.164  Under these circumstances, a 
male teacher who engaged in extramarital sex resulting in pregnancy, but 
who did not discuss his behavior with others, would be protected from 
adverse employment actions.  In contrast, a female teacher who engaged in 
the same behavior and with the same results would be at risk for 
termination, regardless of whether she told anyone about her actions.  
Because extramarital sex may sometimes publicly proclaim itself through 
pregnancy, a female teacher at Harding Academy may be unable either to 
keep her private life private or to keep her job.  A woman’s inability to keep 
private her extramarital sex resulting in pregnancy, coupled with a man’s 
ability to do just that, gives men a clear upper hand in avoiding morality-
based termination.  Such a distinction is gender discrimination, and should 
not be tolerated. 
B.  The "Role Model Defense" and Unwritten Expectations of Morality 
After a supposed erosion of morals took place in the 1950’s and 
1960’s,165 a greater number of parents each year chose to take their children 
out of secular public schools and to place them in sectarian private schools, 
where they felt comforted by the fact that their children would be taught by 
people with a shared system of beliefs and values.166  But for a private 
school tuition, parents often expect much more than just a teacher of 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Rachel Knight, Comment, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers:  Unwed 
Mothers, Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 
511–13 (2004). 
 164. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 165. See Knight, supra note 163, at 486 ("As the rigid social norms of the 1950s and 
early 1960s eroded and collapsed, allowing for greater expression of identity and 
individualism, a simultaneous rising tide of ‘moral panic’ swelled up."). 
 166. Cf. Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344–45 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(describing defendant school promoting to parents that it provides a "Christ-centered 
education" (internal citations omitted)). 
A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 557 
Algebra or Literature—they want a teacher who will serve as a role model 
for their children.167  The Supreme Court recognized this in Ambach v. 
Norwick,168 a decision that emphasized that a "teacher serves as a role 
model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values."169  Since Ambach, schools have used this concept 
of a role model in their defensive strategy, to bolster up the termination of 
teachers whose failure to live up to a moral standard is heralded by 
pregnancy.  This "role model defense" becomes problematic when it 
appears in its "hypnotic though frivolous shape, to divert attention from 
problems of power and authority and social reality in general."170  It is 
"hypnotic" when used to romanticize the relationship between teacher and 
child, such as one author’s claim that "[e]xcept for sex, education is the 
most intimate of human contacts.  Other than marriage, it is the most loving 
and momentous of personal relations."171  When schools put such a strong 
emphasis on the role model relationship between teacher and student, it is 
easy to see how a court’s attention could be diverted from the very real 
problem of gender discrimination in religious schools.  In addition, often 
schools claim that their teachers should be "comprehensive" role models, 
demonstrating how a person of a particular belief system should live every 
part of his or her life.172  But this defense does not comport with social 
reality.  Though schools claim that their teachers should serve as 
comprehensive, full-time role models for their students, it would be difficult 
for any school to enforce this policy in a gender-neutral way that does not 
infringe on the privacy rights of its teachers.173  Still, courts are sometimes 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–81 (1979) (holding that the New York 
Education Law provision that prohibited teachers who are not citizens of the United States 
from obtaining certification to teach public school met the rational basis test required for 
discrimination against aliens, and emphasizing the role model status of school teachers). 
 169. Id. at 78–79. 
 170. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1377, 1384 (1996) (quoting C. WRIGHT MILLS, On Knowledge and Power, in POWER, 
POLITICS AND PEOPLE:  THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF C. WRIGHT MILLS 599, 612 (Irving L. 
Horowitz ed., 1963)) (exposing the problems with the role model defense). 
 171. John Lachs & Shirley M. Lachs, Education and the Power of the 
State:  Reconceiving Some Problems and Their Solutions, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS 235, 237 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989). 
 172. See Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1377, 1393–94 (defining comprehensive role models by stating that they possess two 
common characteristics:  they spend a great deal of time with and exert power over the 
young people who will likely look up to them). 
 173. For example, though a Catholic school may terminate a teacher for publicly 
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swayed by the patriarchal arguments of the schools and agree that acting as 
a role model, abiding by the moral codes of the religious institution, can be 
a BFOQ. 
This was the case in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.,174 an Eighth 
Circuit decision in which the court decided that a policy requiring 
termination of single staff members who became pregnant or caused 
pregnancy was permissible.175  In that case, the court held that this "role 
model rule" was justified both as a business necessity and as a BFOQ.176  
The unique circumstances of that case differentiate it from cases of 
pregnant school teachers.  In Chambers, the staff members’ primary aim 
was to serve as role models and to illustrate all the options that are available 
to young women, not to teach students a secular subject or even to 
indoctrinate them  with a particular set of religious beliefs.177  The staff 
viewed unmarried pregnancy as a serious limiting factor on the success of 
the young women whom the club sought to promote, thought that the 
presence of unmarried pregnant staff members would implicitly condone 
pregnancy without the benefit of marriage, and together decided to sign an 
agreement that unmarried pregnancy would be a termination event.178 
This "role model" defense failed in Vigars v. Valley Christian 
Center.179  In that case, the defendant argued that Vigars, a librarian, was 
                                                                                                                 
proclaiming her pro-choice sentiments, Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, 
450 F. 3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006), and the Boy Scouts may prohibit from being assistant 
scoutmaster a man who publicly proclaimed his homosexuality, Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), these policies are difficult to enforce when members of different 
sexes are not similarly situated with regard to the ability to keep one’s views and actions 
private.  Though a woman may try to hide her unmarried pregnancy, her swelling belly 
publicly proclaims her fornication.  A school would have to work much harder to discover a 
quiet man’s similar transgression. 
 174. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704–05 (1987) (holding 
that the "role model rule" put in place by the staff to discourage unmarried pregnancies was 
a bona fide occupational qualification). 
 175. See id. at 699 n.2  (laying out the policy prohibiting unmarried pregnancies, which 
was contained in the "Major Club Rules," and states:  "The following are not permitted and 
such acts may result in immediate discharge:  . . . 11. Negative role modeling for Girls Club 
Members to include such things as single parent pregnancies"). 
 176. Id. at 703–05. 
 177. Id. at 701. 
 178. Id. at 701–02. 
 179. Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808–09 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992) (rejecting the "role model" defense in which it was unclear "how central her 
moral life was to her job as librarian, whether or not she was truly expected to act as a role 
model in the Chambers sense, and what impact her pregnancy truly had on her ability to 
perform either of those functions"). 
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required to serve as a role model for students at Valley, a parochial school, 
and thus moral character and "non-pregnant out of wedlock" status was a 
BFOQ.180  While the court recognized the precedential value of Chambers, 
it distinguished that case by emphasizing that the Omaha Girls Club 
employees’ "function was to act as role models for young girls."181  Though 
Vigars was required to sign a statement of faith, pledging that she would 
commit herself to instilling fundamentalist Christian values in the students 
with whom she interacted, and would commit herself to a fundamentalist 
Christian lifestyle, her primary function was not to be a role model—it was 
to be a librarian.182  The Vigars court stated that "[a]lthough the analogy [to 
Chambers] is tempting, it is ultimately not persuasive because it loses sight 
of the very narrow focus of the BFOQ and business necessity defenses."183  
The decision even went so far as to state that in order for a quality to be 
considered a BFOQ, "the person’s job must depend upon the discriminatory 
characteristic."184  The school also put forth the weak defense that people 
would be "upset" that the church had "refused to stand up for its religious 
doctrine" as challenged by Vigars.185  The court responded to this by stating 
that "it is clear that fellow employees’ and customers’ ‘preferences’ do not 
constitute BFOQ’s for sex discrimination any more than they constitute 
BFOQ’s for race discrimination."186  Though the court did not address the 
issue of whether serving as a role model could ever be a BFOQ for Vigars’ 
job, because it was deciding only a summary judgment motion, it certainly 
made obvious that the school would have an uphill battle in arguing this 
defense. 
IV. Conclusion 
Though sectarian schools continue to terminate their pregnant, 
unmarried teachers, these women rarely lose their pregnancy discrimination 
suits, and should in fact have an even greater rate of success than they 
currently enjoy.  Because teachers are not "ministers" in the traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. at 808. 
 181. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 182. Id. at 804 (describing the pledges that employees of the school were required to 
make upon their hiring). 
 183. Id. at 808. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 808 n.4. 
 186. Id. 
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sense, as explored in McClure, the schools that employ them should not be 
able to invoke the ministerial exception and thus skirt legitimate issues of 
pregnancy discrimination.  Similarly, schools invoking other religious 
exemptions to Title VII should be required to open up their justifications to 
challenges of pretext, as articulated by the Vigars Ninth Circuit court in its 
analysis of the congressional record.187   
In addition, though a requirement of moral behavior or adherence to a 
"role model" status may be justifiable as a BFOQ, such BFOQs are 
impossible to enforce without preference for the male gender.  As the court 
dryly noted in Dolter, "under present physiological laws of nature women 
are the only members of the human population who can become 
pregnant."188  Men and women will never be "similarly situated" with 
respect to morality requirements such as the ones these private schools 
claim to require, because women are biologically more disposed to show 
the outward manifestations of what a private religious school might view as 
immoral behavior.  Because of this, the nondiscriminatory BFOQ defense 
that was the lynchpin of Harding’s argument in Boyd can never truly exist, 
and so it should never succeed. 
In the Boyd case it should have been impossible for the school to assert 
that morality as a BFOQ was enforced equally across gender lines, 
defendant should have lost its summary judgment motion.  Under those 
circumstances the plaintiff would have most likely succeeded in her claim, 
because the school’s religious justification for her termination could easily 
be established as pretextual.  Because Boyd was not terminated when she 
miscarried, losing a pregnancy that was the result of extramarital sex, and 
was terminated when her second extramarital pregnancy became obvious, 
she could claim that her termination was not the result of the school’s 
enforcing its moral code but was instead the result of her ongoing status as 
a pregnant unmarried woman.189  Boyd’s supervisor even said in her 
testimony that at the time of the miscarriage "she thought to herself at the 
time that if Boyd had been pregnant, she would have had to terminate 
her."190  It should have been obvious to the Boyd court that Harding viewed 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See id. at 807 ("The legislative history of these . . . exemptions indicates 
that . . . although Congress permitted religious organizations to discriminate in favor of 
members of their faith, [they] are not immune from liability for discrimination based 
on . . . sex . . . ." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 188. Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1980). 
 189. See Knight, supra note 163, at 512–13 (2004) (noting that her miscarriage 
provided as much evidence of extramarital sexual activity as her subsequent pregnancy). 
 190. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 1996) 
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Boyd’s pregnancy, not her private sexual activities, as disqualifying her 
from her position. 
Analysis of the "role model" defense leads to a similar conclusion.  
While schools expect their teachers to be comprehensive role models for 
their students, a woman’s unique ability to become pregnant puts her in a 
position where disqualification as a role model is inherently suspect.  
Though schools may claim that all teachers are subject to equal scrutiny of 
their private lives, in order to ensure that they live up to their role model 
status, gender-neutral scrutiny is simply impossible.  While schools may 
emphasize that teachers are role models who are expected to abide by 
certain religious doctrines, these statements should never persuade a 
court—a woman’s rights under the PDA should be weighted far more 
heavily. 
These were the approaches successfully taken by the NYLCU in the 
more recent case referenced at the beginning of this Note, which was settled 
out of court.191  The McCusker case indicates that until the Supreme Court 
decides the open issues as detailed in this Note, sectarian schools will 
continue to push the boundaries of the ministerial and other religious 
exemptions, as well as the boundaries of BFOQs.  Ultimately, when the 
Court addresses these issues, particularly if it does so in the context of 
pregnancy discrimination claims regarding a teacher’s termination from a 
sectarian school, it should decide in favor of women—Title VII requires no 
less. 
  
                                                                                                                 
(emphasis added). 
 191. See NYCLU Defends, supra note 6. 
